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Abstract
Directly asking respondents in contingent valuation surveys their willingness to pay is one of the few quantitative
methods available to assess full economic value (including both use and non-use values) of non-market environmental
goods. It therefore remains vitally important to better understand the reasons for consistently observed violations of
procedural invariance in such surveys. This paper describes an empirical experiment designed to examine whether
uncertainty might provide an explanation for three commonly observed violations of procedural invariance in contingent
valuation. In each case, we present a plausible explanation for each anomaly through decision heuristics brought about
by respondents trying to answer the question truthfully when their underlying preferences are stable but uncertain. Using
a novel semi-parametric estimator, we find little evidence to support the idea that anomalies can be resolved through an
uncertainty explanation, but our experiment provides noteworthy insights into the ways uncertain preferences may be
shaped by the nature of contingent valuation questions.
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Introduction
Applying the concepts of ecosystem services and natural
capital in practice means making decisions that consider
not only the financial costs and benefits of projects but
also the effects of those decisions on the natural environ-
ment. For decision makers, to assess the environment to-
gether with financial costs and benefits requires compara-
bility between the metrics used to measure change.
However, it is common for environmental changes to be
measured in a specific unit which is natural to the envi-
ronmental change itself. For example, measuring changes
to climate in terms of CO2e or flooding hazards in terms
of risk to populations or households. To allow for compa-
rability, economists use economic values as a common
unit of account. For environmental goods, these economic
values need to be estimated using non-market valuation
techniques—one of the most used method of non-market
valuation is the contingent valuation (CV) method, a
stated-preference method which surveys people to elicit
their values.
The validity of the CV method, however, has been
called into question by the repeated observations of vio-
lations of procedural invariances; that is to say, the pref-
erences expressed by respondents are observed to differ
systematically when changes are made to the manner in
which values are elicited (Ariely et al. 2003; Akter et al.
2008; Bateman et al. 2009; Hanley et al. 2009; Ready
et al. 2010; Poe 2016). One explanation which has been
proposed (Ready et al. 1995; Welsh and Poe 1998; Ready
et al. 2001; Flachaire and Hollard 2007; Brouwer 2011;
Akter and Bennett 2013) is that respondents are uncertain
about their preferences and that their uncertainty
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precipitates systematically different responses to different
question formats.1 In other words, it is the process of
requiring individuals to express values in CV surveys as
if they had well-defined certain preferences that leads to
violations of procedural invariance. Testing this hypothe-
sis is the key contribution of this article. Of course, les-
sons from this study are relevant to other stated-
preference methods that are susceptible to the anomalies
under investigation in this study, for example, discrete
choice experiments.
In this paper, we describe the outcomes of an empirical
experiment designed to examine whether uncertainty might
provide an explanation for three commonly observed viola-
tions of procedural invariance: (i) systematic differences in the
values implied by responses to dichotomous choice (DC) CV
questions when compared with open-ended (OE) CV ques-
tions (DC-OE Disparity), (ii) systematic shifts in implied
WTP according to the precision of the figure presented to
respondents in DC-CV questions (bid precision effect) and
(iii) systematic shifts in implied WTP resulting from differ-
ences in the magnitude of an initial bid amount presented to
respondents in a CV survey (bid magnitude effect or starting
point bias). In each case, we present a plausible explanation as
to why each anomaly might be explained through a decision
heuristic brought about by respondents trying to answer the
question truthfully when their underlying preferences are sta-
ble but uncertain. Our experiment involves a split-sample
study in which we first present separate treatment groups with
the types of CV questions that have been observed to evoke
the different anomalies. We follow up with questions that al-
low those respondents to then reveal their underlying uncer-
tain preferences. The simple hypothesis of our study is that
while the initial CV questions may reveal patterns of anoma-
lous responses, the uncertain preferences reported in the
follow-up questions should not systematically differ across
treatment groups.
If we can show that respondents’ uncertain preferences are
invariant to external cues in the initial CV elicitation tasks,
then the prognosis for the CV method is rather encouraging;
by allowing for the possibility of uncertainty, CVmethods can
elicit preferences that conform to many of the expectations of
standard economic theory.
To assess this proposed explanation for CV, anomalies re-
quire an elicitation technique which allows for the expression
of uncertainty. One widely applied approach is the multiple-
bounded discrete choice (MBDC) method (Welsh and Bishop
1993; Welsh and Poe 1998; Alberini et al. 2003; Vossler et al.
2004; Wang et al. 2013; Mahieu et al. 2014) The MBDC
method presents respondents with an ordered list of bids.
For each bid, respondents report on a certainty scale their
likelihood of being willing to pay that amount. Accordingly,
the MBDC method typically presents respondents with a
multiple-bounded choice across bid amounts, consistent with
the payment card method,2 combined with a polychotomous
choice from a scale of certainty ranging from definitely yes to
definitely no. For each respondent, MBDC elicitation pro-
vides data recording a range of values for which that respon-
dent is certain they would pay, we label this the certainty-yes
range, and a range of values over which they are certain they
would not pay, we label this the certainty-no range. Between
those two, there may exist a range of values over which they
are uncertain—we label this the uncertainty range.
The article is organised as follows. In the following section,
we review the three violations of procedural invariance that
form the focus of this study and theorise plausible explana-
tions of those anomalies resulting from uncertain preferences.
We then outline our semi-parametric estimator and present the
experimental design while briefly describing the case study in
which it has been applied. The results of the empirical appli-
cation are presented next followed by a discussion of the im-
plications of our findings and finally, we conclude with some
closing remarks.
Violations of procedural invariance
and uncertainty
It has been hypothesised that the underlying uncertainty in
individuals’ preferences may explain violations of procedural
invariance in CV studies (Ready et al. 2001; Flachaire and
Hollard 2007). Here, we focus specifically on three such
anomalies: DC-OE disparity, bid-level precision effects and
bid-level magnitude effects. While numerous explanations
for these anomalies have been presented in the literature, here,
we focus on the hypothesis that each anomaly results from the
fact that CV questions assume certainty in preferences; the
anomalies arise as a result of respondents adopting decision
heuristics that allow them to answer those questions when
their underlying preferences are actually uncertain.
It is well established in the literature that DC methods of
elicitation tend to return higher estimates of WTP than OE
methods (Boyle et al. 1996; Brown et al. 1996; Ready et al.
1996). A number of authors have previously argued that uncer-
tainty is an explanation for that observation (Ready et al. 1995,
1 Another possible explanation for the observed elicitation anomalies is that
there is something specific about the CV method that fails to encourage re-
spondents to accurately or truthfully reveal their preferences. Research has
focused on the idea that certain formats of CV elicitation encourage strategic
(Carson and Groves 2007) or ill-considered responses (Carson et al. 2007; Poe
and Vossler 2009).
2 The payment card method allows respondents to state the maximum bid they
would be willing to pay, this can be expanded to the multiple-bounded format
where respondents answer whether they would be willing to pay for each of
the k bid amounts.Welsh and Bishop (1993) took themultiple-bounded format
and incorporated polychotomous responses in each of the k bid amounts to
give the multiple-bounded discrete choice method.
G. S. Smith et al.
2001;Welsh and Poe 1998; Flachaire andHollard 2007). At the
core of those arguments is the conjecture that in the presence of
uncertainty, respondents interpret OE and DC questions very
differently. In particular, when faced with an OE question, re-
spondents are believed to report a value that they are reasonably
certain they would pay. In contrast, when presented with a DC
question offering a bid amount of which they are uncertain,
respondents are believed to react as if the question is asking
them whether there is some possibility they would pay that
amount. In the words of Flachaire and Hollard (2007),
Banomalies come from the fact that, when uncertain, respon-
dents tend to answer yes. Indeed, if the bid belongs to his range
of acceptable values, a respondent answers yes...^ (p. 192).
Ready et al. (2001) report empirical findings that support that
assertion. In their data, they observe that respondents who self-
report that they are unsure tend to say Byes^ when answering
DC questions. In contrast, when answering an OE question,
respondents will tend to state that they are not prepared to
pay that amount. The difference in WTP estimates derived
from the two elicitation methods may, therefore, be explained
simply by allowing for the possibility of uncertain preferences.
The bid precision anomaly has received relatively little at-
tention in the CV literature but a number of studies from mar-
keting and psychology document the fact that the precision with
which figures are presented to respondentsmatters (Janiszewski
and Uy 2008; Loschelder et al. 2014). Thomas et al. (2010) use
laboratory experiments to investigate the effect of the roundness
or precision of prices on buyer behaviour and show that buyers
tend to be more willing to accept posted prices for goods when
those prices are presented as a precise figure as opposed to an
equivalent-magnitude rounded figure. Importantly, they also
observe that the strength of this price-precision effect increases
with the level of uncertainty the individual holds for the value of
the good. The authors conjecture that respondents use the pre-
cision as a signal of price negotiability; they suggest that re-
spondents might be more willing to say Bno^ to a rounded-
figure price, especially when uncertain about whether their val-
ue matches that price, in the belief that there may be room to
negotiate that price downwards. We contend that a similar heu-
ristic might be at work in DC-CV surveys that attempt to mimic
posted-price market settings. The heuristic that leads individ-
uals with uncertain preferences to answer Bno^ to rounded-
figure prices may lead respondents to CV surveys to answer
Bno^ to a rounded bid presented in a DC-CV question.
The bid magnitude anomaly has been observed across a
range of CV elicitation formats where it is commonly referred
to as starting point bias. Awidely documented result is that the
bid value offered in an initial DC question systematically influ-
ences the response to subsequent valuation questions. A number
of interpretations of starting point bias have been proposed, such
as the initial value signalling the cost or alternatively acting as an
anchor (McFadden 1994; Herriges and Shogren 1996; Flachaire
and Hollard 2007; Bateman et al. 2009). A frequently posited
explanation is that the initial bid value creates the possibility, at
least momentarily, that the value being estimated is near to the
initial value. A plausible alternative explanation might be found
in uncertain preferences. To illustrate, imagine two individuals
with identical but uncertain preferences, one individual is initial-
ly offered a low bid and one is offered a high bid. The low bid is
comfortably within the certainty-yes range and so, the individual
would answer yes they would pay. Conversely, the high bid is
comfortably within the certainty-no range and so, that individual
would answer no. Both individuals are then asked a second
valuation question for the same bid which is within their uncer-
tainty ranges. The individual initially offered the low bid is com-
ing from a state of certainty about paying to a state of uncertain-
ty; whereas the individual initially offered the high bid is coming
from a state of certainty about not paying to uncertainty. For the
individual coming up from the low bid, a natural reaction might
be to reason that, BI was previously certain I would pay now I
am not certain so to signal that change in state I’ll answer no^.
The reverse is true for the other individual, a way to signal that
there is now a possibility theymight paywould be to answer yes.
In other words, by adopting a simplifying heuristic to deal with
their change in certainty, the individuals may want to express
their different state of certainty by reversing their answers to the
initial question. Again the conjecture is that the anomaly is not
the consequence of shifting preferences; but that respondents
interpret repeated questions differently based on the magnitude
of the previous bid.
As we have shown, the DC-OE anomaly, different re-
sponses to precise and rounded bids, and different responses
to bids of different magnitude might plausibly be explained
through simplifying heuristics adopted by respondents of CV
questions with uncertain preferences.3 The key prediction of
that explanation is that the elicitation procedure does not
change respondents’ underlying uncertain preferences but in-
stead might lead them to express those preferences differently
when confronted with different forms of CV question. The
experiment that we describe subsequently tests for such pat-
terns by eliciting uncertainty ranges and observing if value-
irrelevant details of the elicitation procedure lead to variation
in the uncertainty ranges.
Modelling uncertain contingent valuation
data using a semi-parametric estimator
For the analysis in this paper, we use a novel econometric
method for analysing responses to MBDC questions. Our
estimator adapts multi-state duration models developed in
3 Other anomalies have plausible explanations through the lens of uncertain
preferences: for example, the disparity between WTP and WTA (Dubourg
et al. 1994; Horowitz and McConnell 2002) through respondents with uncer-
tain preferences answering questions in the former frame in a risk averse
manner and questions in the latter frame in a risk seeking manner.
Preference uncertainty as an explanation of anomalies in contingent valuation: coastal management in the UK
the medical stat ist ics l i terature (Frydman 1995;
Commenges 2002; Frydman and Szarek 2009) to analyse
the progression of respondents’ willingness to pay (WTP)
along the money scale. In particular, the estimator we
describe is a semi-parametric three-state duration-
dependent Markov model which allows us to explore
how the certainty range and uncertainty range reported
by respondents are affected by various factors (in our
case, the type of CV question faced in the initial task)
and whether the size of those two ranges affect each other.
Our econometric estimator adds to the toolkit of methods
previously developed to study uncertain preferences in
CV data (Wang 1997; Alberini et al. 2003; Evans et al.
2003; Kobayashi et al. 2012; Mahieu et al. 2017). Our
model is similar to Kobayashi et al. (2012) in that both
model the thresholds, or the transition between levels of
certainty. In the Kobayashi et al. (2012) model, the thresh-
olds are analysed using a Bayesian approach which re-
quires truncated normally distributed error terms. Our es-
timator can be viewed as an alternative with the paramet-
ric assumptions removed. As far as we are aware, this is
the first time that this form of multiple-state duration
modelling has been used in economic analysis.
As illustrated in Fig. 1, as respondents consider succes-
sively larger money amounts, they transition between three
states: the certainty of saying yes, uncertainty and the cer-
tainty of saying no. This of course implies that there are
two associated thresholds: the threshold at which respon-
dents switch from a state of Bcertainly would pay^ to a
state of Buncertainty^; and the threshold between a state
of Buncertainty^ and the state where they Bcertainly would
not pay .^ For the analysis in this paper, these two thresh-
olds are defined using the MBDC card as being, respec-
tively, either the WTP amount at which respondents switch
from Bdefinitely would pay^ to Bprobably would pay^ or
that amount at which the respondent switches from
Bprobably would not pay^ to Bdefinitely would not pay .^
To construct our econometric model, we assume that each
respondent, i, knows the highest amount they certainly would
pay, an amount we label ti and the lowest amount they certain-
ly would not pay, an amount we label xi. The gap between
these two values defines their uncertainty range, the width of
which we define as wi such that xi = ti +wi.
Accordingly, at the heart of our econometric model is a
calculation of the probability of observing a respondent
reporting intervals of the width ti and wi. We write that prob-
ability as
Pr ti;wi½  ¼ Pr ti½ Pr wi j ti½  ð1Þ
Observe that we allow for the possibility that the width of
the uncertainty range wimay be dependent on the width of the
certainty-yes range ti. In the MBDC exercise, respondents
reveal information on their preferences over a finely spaced
grid defined by theM bid points; 0 = b0 ≤ b1 ≤ b2 ≤ … ≤ bM ≤
bM + 1 =∞. Accordingly, our data are discrete in nature identi-
fying only the interval between bid points in which ti and xi
fall. Now, imagine that individual i indicates that they are
certain they would pay each of the first nit bid amounts.
Subsequently, they report that they are in a state of uncertainty
over the next niw bid amounts. Accordingly, for all bid
amounts, bm, where m > nit + niw, they are certain they would
not pay. For the purposes of developing our estimator, we
summarise that discrete data using the following dummy
variables:
& δtij (j = 1, 2,… , M + 1) is a set of dummy variables iden-
tifying the certainty-yes range, where δtij ¼ 1 if respondent
i stated that they certainly would pay bj (such that δ
t
ij ¼ 1
for all j = 1, 2,… , nit intervals) and δ
t
ij ¼ 0 otherwise.
& dtij (j = 1, 2,… ,M + 1) is a dummy variable indicating the
bid interval within which ti must fall. It is identified as the
bid interval after the highest bid amount that respondent i
indicated they certainly would pay.
The notation is a little different for the state of uncer-
tainty. In particular, we are now concerned with the num-
ber of bid intervals over which a respondent reports a
state of uncertainty, while, for the time being, we ignore
the fact that individuals may enter this state at different
bids. For the purpose of clarity, we use k to index the
uncertainty range, where k = 1, 2,… , K, and K is the
greatest number of bid intervals in the uncertainty range
observed in the data. Accordingly,
& δwik k ¼ 1; 2;…;Kð Þ is a set of dummy variables identify-
ing the uncertainty range, where δwik ¼ 1 if respondent i
stated that they were uncertain (such that δwik ¼ 1 for all
k = 1, 2,… , niw intervals) and δ
w
ik ¼ 0 otherwise.
Fig. 1 Three state duration-
dependent Markov process
showing the transition in
respondents’ certainty as money
amounts increase
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& dwik k ¼ 1; 2;…;Kð Þ is a dummy variable indicating the
bid interval within whichwimust fall. It is identified as the
first bid interval before the bid amount that respondent i
indicated they certainly would not pay.
Our model adopts the maximally flexible parameterization
of Pr[ti] in which a set of parameters pj(j = 1, 2, … ,M + 1) are
estimated that capture the probability of respondent i having a
certainty-no range that ends in interval j. Accordingly,
Pr ti½  ¼ ∏
j
p j
dtij ð2Þ
Following Frydman (1995), we parameterise Pr[wi], that is,
the probability that respondent i has an uncertainty range of
width wi, using the hazard function. In particular, we specify
the hazard function using the logistic form;
hwk tið Þ ¼
λk eβti
1þ λk eβti k ¼ 1; 2;…;Kð Þ ð3Þ
where hik ¼ hwk tið Þ represents the probability that respondent i
transitions from their uncertainty range to their certainty-no
range after k intervals of uncertainty. Observe that the hazard
is expressed with maximal flexibility through the estimation
of a set of parameters λk (k = 1, 2, … ,K) that define the base-
line hazard. At the same time, we allow for the width of
certainty-yes range, ti, to influence the hazard through the
parameter β. For example, with a positive β, the hazard is
increasing with ti, in other words, longer certainty-yes ranges
are associated with shorter ranges of uncertainty. Conversely,
with a negative β, the hazard is decreasing with ti, in other
words, longer certainty-yes ranges are associated with longer
ranges of uncertainty (further details on the modelling proce-
dure are provided in Online Resource 1).
Experimental design
Survey respondents each faced a single valuation exercise
made up of three tasks followed by socioeconomic questions
(Online Resource 2). In task 1, respondents were randomly
allocated by an unseen process into one of eight treatment
groups, seven groups received a single-bounded DC question
at a specific bid and the other group received an OE question.
The DC bids were chosen according to two criteria: that they
represented reasonable values suggested by prior focus group
testing and that they generated data that allowed subsequent
testing of our hypotheses. Accordingly, five DC bids of £5,
£30, £60, £100 and £150 were included to provide a range in
magnitude. In addition, we include two precise bids of £28.70
and £31.30 that could be contrasted with the similar magni-
tude bid of £30. The use of the open-ended method, a method
rarely used by economists in recent times (Johnston et al.
2017) and much maligned for its lack of incentive compatibil-
ity properties (Carson and Groves 2007; Carson et al. 2014),
provides us with an important comparison, a group of respon-
dents who see no external cues regarding the WTP value dur-
ing the initial valuation exercise.
Task 2 and task 3 allowed respondents to express uncertainty
about their WTP and were completed by all respondents
regardless of their treatment group. Following the procedure of
Li andMattsson (1995) and Ready et al. (2001), task 2 presented
respondents with a follow-up question that required them to state
the level of certainty they attached to their DC or OE answer
from task 1. Five responses were available:
& I definitely would pay the amount of money.
& I probably would pay the amount of money.
& I am not sure if I would pay this amount of money.
& I probably would not pay the amount of money.
& I definitely would not pay the amount of money.
Task 3 used a novel version of the MBDC method to es-
tablish the values over which respondents are certain and un-
certain. The MBDC card deliberately rejects the uneven (e.g.
exponentially increasing) spacing of value amounts typical of
most payment cards (Rowe et al. 1996; Welsh and Poe 1998;
Kerr 2000) so as to avoid any implicit suggestion that higher
amounts are less plausible. Even spaced, single-unit incre-
ments obviously result in long payment cards; however, to
avoid respondent fatigue, cards were given to the respondent
to fill in so that they could quickly skip all payment levels
regarding which they had complete certainty and just focus on
defining the uncertainty thresholds. This allowed respondents
to work rapidly through the bids amounts. The bids on the
MBDC card ranged from £1 to £500, increasing in £1 incre-
ments, this range was held constant for all respondents to
mitigate the influence of range effects onWTP. The bids were
presented over two pages which were shown to respondents in
advance (Online Resource 3). At the start of task 3, the inter-
viewer marked on the MBDC card the response that the re-
spondent gave to tasks 1 and 2, for example if they were in the
£5 DC treatment group and they said yes in task 1 and that
they probably would pay that amount in task 2 the interviewer
ticked the probably would pay box next to £5. The respondent
was then asked to consider the next bid and indicate their level
of certainty about paying that amount. At this point, the
MBDC card was handed over to the respondent and the re-
spondent worked through the other amounts themselves.
Using the split-sample experiment outlined, we test the
hypothesis that it is the process of requiring individuals to
express values in CV surveys as if they had well-defined cer-
tain preferences that leads to violations of procedural invari-
ance. To test this, we allow respondents to express uncertain
preferences and test these responses for invariance to external
cues in the elicitation procedure.
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For the three anomalies, we focus in on specific data from
the survey. For the DC-OE disparity, we contrast responses to
task 1 from those offered a DC question to those offered an
OE question.We then recode those responses to the same level
of certainty (definitely would pay), using certainty responses
from task 2. For the DC treatment groups, respondents who
were not definitely certain in task 2 were recoded to BNo^. For
the OE treatment group, we could not recode in the same way
because those respondents had not received a referendum-type
question and so instead used the response from task 3 to esti-
mate a WTP value they were definitely certain of paying. For
the bid precision anomaly, we use the £28.70, £30 and £31.30
groups, initially testing for any differences in task 1 responses
between the precise and rounded groups. Subsequently, we
use task 3 to test for any variance in the uncertainty responses,
in particular, the number of responses with positive WTP
values, the size of the reported uncertainty ranges and the
lower and upper bounds of those ranges. This process is re-
peated for the bid magnitude anomaly using the £5, £30, £60,
£100 and £150 treatment groups. If uncertainty is a good
explanation, we would expect to observe consistent uncertain-
ty ranges across the treatment groups.
Implementation
The degree of familiarity (or unfamiliarity) with the environ-
mental good being valued could clearly influence the issue of
response uncertainty. For this reason, we chose to study a good
that is reasonably familiar to survey respondents. Our specific
case study concerns potential improvements in coastal protec-
tion (extending the size of the beach through the installation of
more groynes) in the town of Southwold in Suffolk, UK. One
to one in-person interviewswere conducted over the summer of
2004 by four interviewers at three locations close to areas that
would receive the additional coastal protection if the project
were to go ahead. The interviews were restricted to residents
of the UK who included both local residents and those visiting
from elsewhere in the UK. The average respondent visited the
beaches of Southwold approximately five times a year and so
had a good level of knowledge about the beaches. To control
for any differences in knowledge within the respondent sample,
the coastal management proposal was described by the inter-
viewer and illustrated with maps and visual representations of
the site before and after. Survey respondents were informed that
the existing defences would be maintained by government
funding but that additional improvements would require them
to contribute through an increase in general taxation.
Results
The study collected a sample of 952 respondents across eight
treatments. Of those, 36 were classified as unusable for the
subsequent analysis; exclusions being due to incomplete
MBDC tasks (e.g. stating only a single Bnot sure^ figure and
no values for other polychotomous choice options). In addi-
tion to this, 4 respondents ticked that they were certain they
would pay all the way up to £500 (the upper limit of the
payment card). This data, although possibly very important
for total WTP estimates in standard CVanalyses, fails to pro-
vide any information about the location or width of the range
of values to which the respondent is uncertain and so is ig-
nored for the purposes of this article. As such, the total usable
sample was 916 respondents, with the OE group containing
272 respondents and the DC groups each containing between
85 and 95 respondents. Online Resource 4 provides details of
the socioeconomic composition of each treatment group. No
significant differences are observable across socioeconomic
characteristics in the eight treatments, suggesting that the
randomisation to treatment groups was successful.
Violation of procedural invariance: (1) Dichotomous
Choice-Open Ended disparity
Our experiment definitively replicates the familiar disparity in
preferences between DC and OE elicitation. Figure 2 summa-
rises the preferences expressed by each of the five (rounded)
DC treatment groups and the OE treatment group in task 1.
The markers indicate the proportion of respondents willing to
pay the bid presented to their DC treatment group. Preferences
for the OE treatment group are summarised through the WTP
survivor function (calculated using the Kaplan-Meier estima-
tor). For clarity, the function plots out the proportion of re-
spondents who stated a WTP greater than or equal to each
amount. At each bid, the preferences elicited using DC ques-
tions imply substantially higher WTP than those elicited with
OE.
Our central question is whether this DC-OE disparity can
be explained as resulting from uncertain preferences. Ready
et al. (2001) hypothesise that in a DC setting, a respondent
may state that they are willing to pay a bid amount lying in
0 30 60 100 150
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Bid Amount/Willingness to pay (£)
P
ro
po
rt
io
n 
of
 r
es
po
nd
en
ts Dichotomous Choice
Open Ended
£5
£28.70
£30
£31.30
£60
£100 £150
Fig. 2 Proportion of BYes^ responses to dichotomous choice questions
(task 1) and empirical survivor function of open-ended treatment group
(task 1) against bid amount/willingness to pay
G. S. Smith et al.
their uncertainty range, but, in response to an OE question,
submit a WTP value from the bottom of that range. We test
that hypothesis by comparing responses to the DC and OE
questions once they have both been standardised to the same
level of certainty; following Ready et al. (2001), we standard-
ise on amounts that respondents Bdefinitely would pay^ from
responses to task 2.4 The results of that analysis are reported in
Table 1.
In line with the hypothesis, once responses have been
standardised to the same level of certainty, we see consider-
able convergence between DC and OE responses. Contrary to
the findings of Ready et al. (2001), however, our data suggest
that DC respondents continue to indicate higher levels of
WTP than respondents to OE. Indeed, a statistical comparison
shows those differences to be significant at the £150 level of
WTP (p value 0.011) and marginally significant at the £30
level of WTP (p value 0.051).
Ready et al. (2001) also report that nine of the 11 respon-
dents (82%) who classed their level of certainty as Bnot sure^
responded Byes^ to the DC question. This is taken as
supporting evidence of uncertain respondents answering affir-
matively to DC elicitation questions. Unfortunately, our data
provides less compelling evidence. Only 12% of the 25 re-
spondents that classed their level of certainty as BNot Sure^
opted to answer Byes^.
Violations of procedural invariance: (2) bid precision
effect
Our second stated-preference anomaly concerns systematic
differences in responses in DC elicitation resulting from dif-
ferences in the precision of the bid. To study that anomaly, we
presented different treatment groups with bids of £28.70, £30
and £31.30. Confirming previous evidence from the market-
ing literature (e.g. Thomas et al. (2010)), our data shows that
substantially fewer respondents answered Byes^ to the round-
ed bid of £30 (34%) than answered Byes^ to the precise bids of
£28.70 and £31.30 (50%) in task 1 (p value 0.011). A precise
bid, it appears, encourages higher levels of bid acceptance
than a rounded bid.
Again, our focus is on discovering whether uncertain pref-
erences might explain this bid precision effect. To assess that
hypothesis, we begin by considering whether bid precision
affects the number of respondents indicating positive WTP.
MBDC data from task 3 shows that those offered a precise
bid were more likely to report a positiveWTP, 64% for £28.70
and 53% for £31.30, than those offered a rounded bid, 51% for
£30. While the difference in proportions for the £28.70 and
£30 groups is statistically significant at the 10% level of con-
fidence (p value 0.098), overall, there is only weak evidence to
suggest that bid precision systematically impacts on the like-
lihood of respondents stating a positive WTP.
Next, we explore in detail the uncertainty ranges reported
in the MBDC exercise by respondents with a positive WTP.
Table 2 compares the mean amount the respondent is certain
they would pay and the mean uncertainty ranges. As reported
in the final column of Table 2, we see no evidence of statisti-
cally significant differences in either the level of WTP or the
range of uncertainty in WTP between those offered precise or
rounded DC bids.
The means of the data provide evidence that supports the
hypothesis that uncertain preferences are unaffected by bid-
level precision. A rather different picture emerges, however,
as we begin to disaggregate the MBDC data. Observe the
bottom half of Table 2 which explores the degree to which
the lower and upper bounds of respondents’ uncertainty
ranges are shaped by the DC bid they encounter. The table
lists the numbers of respondents in each treatment group for
whom the minimum or maximum of their uncertainty range is
close to that bid. We define Bclose^ as being in the range £28
to £30 for the £28.70 group, £29 to £31 for the £30 group and
£30 to £32 for the £31.30 group. Notice that a substantially
larger proportion of respondents report an uncertainty range
that begins close to the bid when that bid is precise (56% for
£28.70 and 33% for £31.30) than when that bid is rounded
(21% for the £30 group) (p value of 0.003). Though most of
the work is being done by the comparison of the £28.70 to £30
groups (p value 0.000).5 This result is robust to different def-
initions of Bcloseness^ with definitions ranging from the
nearest £1 to the nearest £5 producing qualitatively identical
results.
Table 2 also reveals that the precision of the bid only ap-
pears to focus the lower bound of uncertainty ranges and not
the upper bound. A statistical comparison of the proportions
of respondents with an upper bound to their uncertainty range
close to their bid reveals no significant differences between
precise-figure and rounded-figure treatment groups (p value
0.835).
Violations of procedural invariance: (3) bid-level
magnitude effect
Our investigation of the bid magnitude effect focuses on the
£5, £30, £60, £100 and £150 treatment groups. We begin our
analysis by studying the proportion of respondents in each DC
treatment group that reported a positive WTP amount in task
3, the MBDC question. The clear anomaly in those data is the4 The task 2 data reveals a U-shaped relationship between certainty and the bid
level amount, this is in line with findings from (Loomis and Ekstrand 1998;
Brouwer 2011; Logar and van den Bergh 2012). In particular, those offered
high/low bid amounts were more certain about their response than those of-
fered mid-level bid amounts.
5 Interestingly, statistical significance is also observable between £28.70 and
£31.30 (p value 0.029) suggesting that precision of the bid alone is not a good
explanation.
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£5 group, where some 65% of respondents reported some
positive level of WTP in the MBDC exercise. Statistical com-
parison through a series of pairwise tests reveals significantly
higher proportions of positive responses for that group com-
pared with all other bid levels; at the 1% level of significance
for the £60 and £100 groups (p value 0.000 and p value 0.005)
and at the 10% level of significance for £30 and £150 groups
(p value 0.058 and p value 0.074). For all other pairwise com-
parisons, no significant differences are observed. Barring the
£5 group, it appears that bid magnitude does not significantly
impact on the proportion of respondents reporting a positive
WTP.
Table 3 repeats our analysis of the focusing effect; that is to
say, the degree to which respondents fix either the lower or
upper bounds of their reported uncertainty ranges to the DC
bid. Again, we observe no discernible impact of bid magni-
tude on the upper bound of the reported uncertainty range
(p values 0.310 to 0.784). Moreover, amongst the £30, £60,
£100 and £150, we see no significant impact on the lower
bound of their uncertainty range. The only notable exception
is again the £5 group, where some 51% of respondents report
a lower bound to their uncertainty range close to the DC bid
compared with 10 to 22% across other groups. Again, those
differences prove significant at the 1% level for all pairwise
comparisons with the £5 group (p values 0.000 to 0.009). Of
course, £5 could just happen to be a more common lower
bound across the survey respondents in general. The final
column of the table clearly shows this is not the case as the £5
treatment group has a much high percent of respondents with
lower bounds of their uncertainty range close to £5 (51%) than
all other groups (3 to 21%). Overall, the data provides some
evidence to suggest that the £5 bid is sufficiently Bprecise^ as
to invoke similar responses to the precise-figure bids.
Looking once again at the data in Table 3, it is of course
rather surprising that amongst the rounded bid groups, we
observe almost the same proportion of respondents stating that
their uncertainty range starts close to the bid they are presented
with independent of whether that bid is £30, £60, £100 or
£150. If uncertainty ranges are unaffected by the magnitude
of bids, it would perhaps be more likely to see those propor-
tion falling.
To understand this result better, Fig. 3 shows the average
uncertainty range reported in the MBDC exercise with the OE
group represented by the lower-most horizontal bar with the
Table 1 Unstandardised and
certainty-standardised acceptance
proportions under open-ended
and dichotomous choice elicita-
tion methods
Bids Acceptance proportions (task 1) Certainty-standardised acceptance proportions (tasks 2 and 3)
Bids OEa DCb p valuec,d OEa DCb p valuec,d
5 39.0% 63.7% 0.000*** 36.4% 39.6% 0.617
30 10.7% 33.7% 0.000*** 8.5% 15.8% 0.051*
60 4.8% 19.4% 0.000*** 3.3% 5.4% 0.360
100 4.8% 12.6% 0.016** 2.9% 5.3% 0.334
150 0.7% 11.7% 0.000*** 1.1% 6.4% 0.011**
aOpen-ended
bDichotomous choice
c Proportions test using Fisher-Exact method
d Significance levels: *0.10, **0.05, ***0.01
Table 2 Summary of uncertainty ranges and percentage of responses with lower or upper bounds of their uncertainty range close to the dichotomous
choice bids offered in task 1 for dichotomous choice treatment groups £28.70, £30 and £31.30
Mean uncertainty ranges for respondents with positive willingness to pay (95% confidence intervals) Difference in means of
multiple groups (p values)
Treatment groups £28.70 £30 £31.30
Highest certainly would pay (£) 26.6 (21.6–31.6) 27.3 (17.4–37.3) 24.6 (19.5–29.7) 0.857b
Width of uncertainty range (£) 15.4 (12.1–18.7) 21.0 (14.2–27.7) 19.7 (14.4–25.0) 0.294b
Percent of responses with lower or upper bounds of their uncertainty range close to the task 1 bid level
Lower bounda 56% 21% 33%
Upper bounda 20% 21% 27%
Observations 54 48 48
a Percentage of respondents whose uncertainty range lower (upper) bounds from task 3 are within £1 of the bid level amount received in task 1’s
dichotomous choice question (£28.70 = 28 to £30, £30 = £29 to £31 and 31.30 = £30 to £32)
b p value calculated from ANOVA F-test of equality of means across multiple groups
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DC treatment groups above. If the uncertainty ranges were
invariant to the magnitude of the bid presented in the first task,
we would expect to see the bars in Fig. 3 stacked vertically. It
is clear that this is not the case, Fig. 3 shows an upward trend
in the mean lower bound of the uncertainty range from £9.80
for those offered £5 to £45.40 for those offered £150, the only
exception to this upward trend is the mean lower bound for the
£100 group. There is a similar upward trend in the mean width
of the uncertainty range with the exception again being the
£100 group which has the largest mean uncertainty range
width. An F-test of equality of means between the multiple
treatment groups reveals significant difference at the 99%
confidence level showing that at least one of the treatment
groups has a different mean lower bound and different width
of their uncertainty range to another treatment group (p value
0.000 and 0.007).
With regard to the effect of bidmagnitude on stated uncertainty
ranges, we are left with a final question; what causes the width of
the average uncertainty range to increase as bid magnitude in-
creases. One possibility is that respondents with higherWTP sim-
ply have a larger uncertainty range. In that case, presenting respon-
dents with larger magnitude bids will have an indirect effect on
uncertainty ranges; larger magnitude bids result in higher overall
levels of WTP which in turn result in increases in reported
uncertainty ranges. Alternatively, the bid magnitude may have a
direct effect on uncertainty ranges; that is to say, the magnitude of
the bid itself induces greater uncertainty in respondents’
preferences.
To understand which of those two hypotheses is best sup-
ported by out data, we employ our semi-parametric estimator.
We define a set of dummy variables q0 to q4 with q0 defining
the £5 treatment and q1 to q4 defining the other DC treatments
(such that, q1 = £30 DC treatment and q4 = £150 DC treat-
ment) and use those to parameterise the two BWTP state
durations^; width of the certainty-yes range (t) and width of
the uncertainty range (w). Parameters α = [α0 α1…α4] cap-
ture the impact of DC treatment on the width of the certainty-
yes range; β captures the impact of level of WTP on width of
the uncertainty range while β0 β1… β4 capture the indepen-
dent effect of DC treatment on the width of the uncertainty
range. For the purposes of identification, we set β0 = 0 and
α0 = 0 such that the £5 treatment forms our comparator group.
Table 4 reports parameters of the estimated model. The first
two columns report the parameters associated with the proba-
bility of transitioning from a state of Bcertainly would pay^ to
one of Buncertainty .^ Observe that the probability of transition
for each of the DC treatment groups is significantly different
from that of £5 treatment group at greater than the 99.9%
confidence level. Moreover, the treatment group parameters
are all negative indicating that individuals offered an initial bid
of £30 or more had significantly lower transition hazards com-
pared with the £5 group. In other words, respondents in those
treatment groups are more likely to report a longer certainty-
yes range. Observe also that the hazard tends to decrease for
higher bid amounts; that is to say, the larger the magnitude of
bid presented in the initial task, the larger the amounts that
respondents continue to report they are certain they would
pay. Reflecting the pattern seen in Fig. 3, the only exception
is the £100 group, which appears to exert a weaker pull on the
lower bound of respondents’ uncertainty ranges than would be
expected from the pattern of the other rounded bids.
Table 3 Percentage of responses with lower or upper bounds of their uncertainty range close to the dichotomous choice bids offered in task 1
Bids Number of observations Lower bounda £5 group compared
with other groupsb,d
Upper bounda £5 group compared
with other groupsb,d
Lower bound
close to £5c
£5 59 51% – 15% – 51%
£30 48 21% 0.002*** 21% 0.460 13%
£60 36 22% 0.009*** 19% 0.587 3%
£100 42 10% 0.000*** 24% 0.310 21%
£150 48 15% 0.000*** 13% 0.784 10%
a Percentage of respondents whose uncertainty range lower (upper) bounds from task 3 are within £1 of the bid level amount received in task 1’s
dichotomous choice question
b Proportions test using Fisher-Exact method
c Percentage of respondents whose uncertainty range lower bound from task 3 are within £1 of £5 (£4 to £6)
d Significance levels: *0.10, **0.05, ***0.01
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Fig. 3 Uncertainty ranges for mean willingness to pay for respondents
allocated to different initial dichotomous choice bid levels or to the open-
ended elicitation method
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The parameter estimates reported in the final two columns
of Table 4 are those associated with the width of respondents’
uncertainty ranges. Since the model is parameterised in terms
of the hazard function, the highly significant and negative β
reveals that the higher up the WTP scale a respondent enters
uncertainty, the smaller their transition probability is for
exiting uncertainty. In other words, respondents who state
higher certain WTP amounts also exhibit wider uncertainty
ranges. Now, consider the parameters estimated on the treat-
ment dummy variables. The results show evidence that, hav-
ing controlled for the WTP-level effect, only the £100 group
has a significant larger uncertainty range than might be ex-
pected. For each of the other groups, we cannot reject the
hypothesis that the DC bid only impacts on the uncertainty
range indirectly by altering the overall magnitude of WTP.
Discussion
This article set out to explore the hypothesis that common
violations of procedural invariance observed in CV studies
may arise because respondents with uncertain preferences
are required to answer as if those preferences were precisely
defined even when valuing complex and unfamiliar environ-
mental non-market goods. To answer that, we explored three
common elicitation anomalies, DC-OE disparity, bid precision
effect and bid magnitude effect (starting point bias) through
the analysis of CV survey designed to specifically allow for
the expression of uncertainty.
Our data provide little support for the Ready et al. (2001)
hypothesis that DC-OE disparity can be resolved through an
uncertainty explanation. We observed some evidence of con-
vergence when answers under the two formats were compared
at the same level of respondent certainty but significant differ-
ences remained. In addition, our data contradicts one key find-
ing of Ready et al. (2001) as we found no increased propensity
for respondents to answer Byes^ when presented with a DC
bid that falls in their uncertainty range. Indeed, our data sug-
gested the opposite tendency with a large majority of respon-
dents in those circumstances answering Bno^. The contradic-
tions between the empirical results of this paper and those of
Ready et al. (2001) along with the failure amongst economists
to agree on a definitive method to measure uncertainty
(Vossler et al. 2003; Akter et al. 2008) suggest that CV
methods that attempt to recode or calibrate WTP values ac-
cording to respondent uncertainty should be treated cautiously
before being applied to important policy questions.
Our data also indicate that accounting for preference uncer-
tainty does not resolve the bid precision anomaly or the bid
magnitude anomaly. In both cases, we observe uncertainty
ranges that are malleable to the nature of the bid presented in
the initial DC valuation question. In particular, increases in the
precision of the bid elicit uncertainty ranges whose lower
bounds are more closely focused on that bid amount. The fo-
cusing of the lower bound of the uncertainty range suggests that
the bid precision presented to respondents in a DC question not
only alters their readiness to answer Byes^ to that question but
also fundamentally alters the nature of the underlying uncertain
preferences they report. In addition to the precision of the bid
amount, other psychological pricing effects such as Bodd
pricing^—where a price of 99p seems a better deal for
customers—may also be part of the explanation (Koschate-
Fischer and Wüllner 2017), One theory is that people pay par-
ticular attention to the left digits of a price and save on mental
application by downgrading the importance of the other digits
(Thomas and Morwitz 2005; Shampanier et al. 2007).
Similarly, increasing the magnitude of the bid caused the
lower bound of the uncertainty range to shift upwards. Our
data also indicate that differences in the width of uncertainty
ranges are mostly captured by the indirect effect of bid mag-
nitude on the overall level of WTP. The only exception is the
£100 treatment group who report a significantly wider
Table 4 Semi-parametric estimator output
Transition hazard parameters Certainty-yes to uncertainty transition –
with parameters for initial bid effecta
htj qið Þ
Transition Hazard parameters Uncertainty to certainty-no transition –
with parameters for initial bid effecta
hwk ti; qið Þ
Entry point into uncertainty β − 0.0130*** (0.0025)
£5 α0 Base case £5 β0 Base case
£30 α1 − 1.0052 *** (0.1880) £30 β1 − 0.3010 (0.1895)
£60 α2 − 1.2350*** (0.2040) £60 β2 − 0.1235 (0.2188)
£100 α3 − 1.0974*** (0.1975) £100 β3 − 0.5148* (0.2049)
£150 α4 − 1.4980*** (0.1894) £150 β4 − 0.3044 (0.2149)
Log likelihood − 636.12 − 757.83
Obs 229 229
a Significance levels: *0.05, **0.01, ***0.001
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uncertainty range than might be expected from the indirect
effect alone. We postulate that this may also result from a
bid precision effect with more rounded bids eliciting wider
uncertainty ranges as it acts as a weaker anchor for fixing
the lower bound of the uncertainty range.
Overall, preferences expressed in response to a single-
bounded dichotomous choice bid level are substantially and
significantly distorted simply through making very minor al-
terations in the precision of a bid. This results contrast with
contemporary advice on best practice for CV design (Johnston
et al. 2017). Interestingly, our data also provides some insights
as to the preferences reported by respondents when no cue is
given. Responses to OE elicitation return WTP estimates that
are conservative compared with those implied by DC elicita-
tion. Indeed, our follow-up MBDC question reveals that re-
spondents draw their OE values consistently from the low end
of their uncertainty range. Moreover, observing Fig. 3 and
contrasting the average uncertainty range of the OE group to
those in the DC treatments suggest that OE elicitation does not
result in ranges that are excessively wide and, in the opinion of
these authors, suggest WTP values in an entirely plausible
range.
The results of this study have to be handled with care, for a
number of reasons. The survey data although a large sample
overall, reduces to sample groups of just below 100 for each
DC treatment. This sample is reduced further when consider-
ing respondents who stated a willingness to pay off greater
than £0. In addition, the survey data does not allow for anal-
ysis of protest voting amongst respondents, an issue which has
been shown to affect the estimation ofWTP values (Jorgensen
et al. 1999). This could be a potential confounder for the OE
elicitation results as that method is known to induce respon-
dents to strategically misrepresent their preferences. However,
if one presumes that a possible manifestation of such strategic
behaviour would be to indicate zero WTP, we find no evi-
dence to indicate that happens with greater frequency in the
OE treatment compared with the DC groups (47% of respon-
dents in the OE treatment group stated a zero WTP in the
MBDC exercise compared with 48% across all DC groups).
Finally, raising the issue of uncertainty may itself stimulate
additional consideration of values amongst respondents
(Carson et al. 2007; Bateman et al. 2008; Poe and Vossler
2009) or allow for strategic behaviour (Carson and Groves
2007). However, as the approach to uncertainty elicitation is
constant across all respondents, any effects of such introspec-
tion should not differ across elicitation format.
Conclusions
Directly asking respondents in CV surveys their WTP is one
of the few quantitative methods available to assess full eco-
nomic value (including both use and non-use values) of non-
market goods. It therefore remains vitally important to better
understand the reasons for consistently observed violations of
procedural invariance in such surveys. Unfortunately, our
study shows that allowing for uncertainty in preferences
may not provide the simple panacea to the problems of CV
anomalies.
Our experiment provides some noteworthy new insights
into the ways in which the preferences expressed in response
to CV questions may be shaped by the nature of those ques-
tions. Most significantly, we find that in a single-bounded DC
question, significantly more respondents answer affirmatively
when presented with a precise bid than when presented with a
rounded bid of the same approximate magnitude. Second, we
find that the uncertainty ranges reported in MBDC elicitation
respond in systematic ways to cues given by bids in initial DC
tasks. Uncertainty ranges shifted up theWTP scale by increas-
ing the magnitude of that bid and the lower bound (but not the
upper bound) of uncertainty ranges are increasingly focused
on the bid the greater the precision of the bid. While much has
been made of the incentive compatibility of the single-
bounded DC approach (Carson and Groves 2007; Carson
et al. 2014), a clear conclusion of our research is that that
elicitation method is not robust to other factors that may in-
fluence expressions of preferences.
Despite a long tradition of claims for the theoretical supe-
riority of DC elicitation methods (Arrow et al. 1993; Carson
and Groves 2007), our results suggest an empirical reality; the
cues provided by bids act to systematically alter responses to
single-bounded DC questions and shape the expressions of
uncertain preferences reported in a follow-upMBDC exercise.
Given those findings, we reach the conclusion that there may
be some merit in revisiting the much-maligned open-ended
form of value elicitation.
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